China’s economic ascent, fueled by globalism, created a 700-million-strong middle class but left it reliant on $153 billion in annual food imports. Initially, the world marveled at China’s breakneck growth, with GDP soaring at an unsustainable pace under Xi Jinping’s centralized leadership. Commentators praised the efficiency of “one man” making decisions, delivering skyscrapers, high-speed rail, and factories overnight. Yet, no one is infallible. Now, as tax revenues falter, the $10 trillion real estate bubble implodes, and massive waste in electric vehicles (EVs), rail, steel overcapacity, and tech crackdowns becomes undeniable, the cracks are clear. Xi’s short-sighted regulations on the tech industry, costing 2-3 million jobs, further expose the perils of entrusting a nation’s fate to one leader. If China were a democratic country, individual voices, market signals, and accountable governance could have prioritized food production over speculative industries, averting its current vulnerabilities—looming job losses, trade backlash, and food import dependence. This article explores how a democratic China might have reshaped its priorities, drawing on the themes of globalism and middle-class dynamics from "The Great Shift."
The Authoritarian Trap: China’s Misguided Investments
China’s top-down system, once lauded for its decisiveness, drove massive resource misallocation under Xi Jinping’s unchecked authority:
- Electric Vehicle Overproduction: Over 100 EV startups, backed by $100-200 billion in subsidies, remain largely unprofitable (Caixin, 2023), with only BYD and Tesla China succeeding.
- Ghost Cities: An estimated $1-2 trillion was spent building underpopulated urban centers like Ordos, leaving 50 million housing units empty (Bloomberg, 2018). Many of these ghost cities were constructed on fertile farmland that could have been preserved for agriculture or, with minimal investment, reclaimed from desert to expand arable land, bolstering food security instead of wasting resources on vacant concrete landscapes.
- High-Speed Rail: A $1 trillion network, including loss-making rural routes, burdens China with $800 billion in debt (Reuters, 2023).
- Steel Overcapacity: Subsidies created a 300-million-ton steel surplus, with China producing 53.9% of global crude steel in 2023 at 73.8% capacity utilization (OECD, 2023). Global tariffs now idle mills.
- Real Estate Bubble: China’s property sector, 30% of GDP, faces a $10 trillion debt crisis, with developers like Evergrande collapsing and 20% of urban homes vacant (Bloomberg, 2024).
- Tech Crackdowns: Xi’s 2020-2023 regulations on tech giants (e.g., Alibaba, Tencent) and private education wiped out $1.7 trillion in market value and 2-3 million jobs, stifling innovation (Nikkei Asia, 2024).
These projects, totaling $5-7 trillion in low-return investments (IMF, 2023), prioritized short-term growth over resilience. Faltering tax revenues—down 2.6% in 2023 due to property and export slumps (China Ministry of Finance)—limit China’s ability to address these failures. Food security suffered, with China importing 20% of its calories ($153 billion in 2022, UNCTAD) after losing 8.3 million hectares of farmland to industry and urbanization (FAO, 2020). As trade tensions and job losses mount, this dependency looms large.
Steel Mills on Farmland: A Costly Misstep
Many of China’s steel mills, built on fertile farmland, now sit idle due to global tariffs, reflecting a strategic blunder under Xi’s leadership. Between 2000 and 2020, China’s steelmaking capacity grew to over 967,000 tons annually, more than double the USA, EU, and India combined (Global Energy Monitor, 2024). Coastal provinces like Hebei and Jiangsu, where farmland was converted for industrial zones, hosted much of this expansion.
- Idle Mills Due to Tariffs: Tariffs from the USA (25% under Section 232, 2025), EU (anti-dumping duties), Japan (restrictions), South Korea (38% on steel plates), and India (25% safeguard duties proposed) have slashed Chinese steel exports. In 2024, China exported 110.72 million tons, but falling domestic demand and tariffs reduced mill utilization to 73.8%, with profit margins below 1% (OECD, 2023; X posts). Estimates suggest 20-30% of China’s 1,200+ steel mills (240-360 mills) are idle or minimally active, with many in former farmland regions like Hebei, which lost 1.2 million hectares of farmland (2000-2010, FAO). Precise data on idle mills built on farmland is limited, but Hebei’s 200+ mills report widespread closures (X posts).
- Strategic Miscalculation: China assumed global markets would absorb its steel, underestimating steel’s strategic importance to other nations’ militaries (e.g., for ships, tanks). The USA, EU, Japan, South Korea, and India imposed tariffs to protect 80,000 US steel jobs (American Iron and Steel Institute, 2024) and military supply chains, with Vietnam and others following. Xi’s regime misjudged the world’s willingness to let China bankrupt their steel industries, leaving mills idle and farmland sacrificed.
The Illusion of Infallibility: Xi’s Centralized Failures
During China’s GDP surge—peaking at 10% annual growth in the 2000s—global observers envied its authoritarian efficiency. “One man” making decisions seemed to deliver results: Shenzhen’s skyline, high-speed rail, and steel dominance. Yet, Xi Jinping’s unchecked power proved fallible:
- Real Estate Bubble: Xi’s push for urbanization fueled a $10 trillion property debt crisis, with 20% of urban homes vacant and developers like Evergrande bankrupt (Bloomberg, 2024). Tax revenues, tied to land sales, dropped 2.6% in 2023, crippling local governments (China Ministry of Finance).
- EV and Rail Waste: Xi’s subsidies for EVs ($100-200 billion) and rail ($1 trillion) created unprofitable industries, with 90% of EV startups failing and rural rail lines losing billions (Caixin, 2023; Reuters, 2023).
- Tech Crackdowns: Xi’s 2020-2023 regulations on tech giants and education erased $1.7 trillion in market value and 2-3 million jobs, alienating young workers (Nikkei Asia, 2024).
- Economic Fallout: As exports face tariffs and domestic demand weakens, China’s GDP growth slowed to 4.7% in 2024, with youth unemployment at 15% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2024). The world now sees the cost of one man’s short-sighted vision.
A democratic China could have avoided these errors by distributing decision-making, revealing the folly of betting a nation’s future on one leader’s judgment.
How Democracy Could Have Shifted Priorities
A democratic China, with individual voices, transparent governance, and market-driven incentives, would have prioritized food production over speculative industries like EVs, steel, and tech overreach. Here’s how:
- Individual Voices and Public Debate
- Authoritarian Context: Xi’s regime silences farmers and rural communities, who lost 8.3 million hectares of farmland to steel mills, ghost cities, and urban sprawl, with no platform to advocate for agriculture.
- Democratic Alternative: Citizens could vote, protest, or use media to push for food security. Farmers’ unions could lobby to preserve farmland, highlighting idle steel mills and import risks. Public debates would scrutinize Xi’s EV, rail, steel, and tech policies, redirecting funds to agriculture.
- Impact: Grassroots pressure could have driven Israel-style innovations (drip irrigation, desalination), boosting yields and creating rural jobs, unlike the urban manufacturing focus that employed Wei Chen in "The Great Shift."
- Market Signals Over Central Planning
- Authoritarian Context: Xi’s planners overinvested in EVs, steel, and tech to dominate markets, ignoring overcapacity, tariffs, and tech job losses. Food production was sidelined, as imports seemed cheaper (e.g., 99.4 million tons of soybeans, USDA, 2023).
- Democratic Alternative: Private enterprises would guide growth. Unprofitable EV startups, steel mills, and tech firms would fail faster, freeing capital for agriculture. Rising food import costs ($153 billion/year) would spur investment in greenhouses, vertical farming, or land reclamation.
- Impact: Market discipline could have allocated $500 billion to irrigation and desalination, adding 50 million hectares of farmland (based on Israel’s 20-50% yield gains), cutting imports by $50-75 billion annually.
- Decentralized Decision-Making and Accountability
- Authoritarian Context: Local governments, under Xi’s growth mandates, converted farmland for steel mills, ghost cities, and cities like Shenzhen, prioritizing land sale profits. Central oversight failed until the 120-million-hectare arable land “red line” (2008).
- Democratic Alternative: Local elections would empower communities to protect farmland. Environmental groups could challenge steel mill and ghost city sprawl, especially as tariffs idle mills. Transparent budgets would redirect funds from failing projects to food security.
- Impact: Preserving 5 million hectares of farmland and investing $300 billion in high-tech farming could produce 20-30% of China’s vegetable and fruit needs, employing 10-20 million workers.
- Long-Term Vision Through Voter Priorities
- Authoritarian Context: Xi prioritized short-term growth, betting on trade to cover food imports. This worked during the middle-class boom (700 million people, World Bank, 2020) but falters as tariffs, idle mills, and tech job losses threaten stability.
- Democratic Alternative: Voters, concerned about food prices and layoffs from steel and tech, would demand resilience. Public campaigns could push for self-sufficiency, funding rural infrastructure over Xi’s speculative projects.
- Impact: A democratic China might have adopted Israel’s desert-blooming model, using $200 billion to reclaim 10 million hectares of degraded land, growing 50 million tons of grain annually.
Addressing the Scale Counterargument: Israel vs. China
Some argue Israel’s food security success—using drip irrigation and river diversion—was feasible only because it’s a small country with 7 million people (now 9.8 million). China, with 1.4 billion people, faces a different scale. However, water availability tells a different story.
- Water Per Capita Comparison: Israel has less water per person, about 1,800 liters annually, compared to China’s 2,000 liters (World Bank, 2020). Israel’s water scarcity is more severe, making its achievements—irrigating 20% of arid land—more challenging than equivalent projects in China would be.
- Implication for China: With more water per capita, China could implement Israel-style solutions more easily, especially in a democracy where public demand could drive investment over Xi’s wasteful projects. For example, $500 billion could fund drip irrigation for 50 million hectares (40% of China’s farmland), boosting yields by 20-50% (Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, 2020).
- Democratic Advantage: Public awareness, amplified by free media, could have prioritized agricultural innovation over steel mills now idled by tariffs, tech crackdowns costing millions of jobs, or ghost cities built on farmland.
Benefits of Prioritizing Food Production
Redirecting $1-2 trillion from EVs, steel, ghost cities, rail, and tech overreach to food production would yield:
- Reduced Import Dependence: Cutting $153 billion in food imports by 50% would save $75 billion/year, easing pressures as tax revenues and steel exports decline.
- Rural Job Creation: Agricultural investment could employ 10-20 million workers, offsetting layoffs from idle steel mills and tech crackdowns, stabilizing rural economies unlike Wei Chen’s urban migration.
- Food Security: Domestic production would shield against global shocks, ensuring affordable food for 1.4 billion people.
- Economic Resilience: Unlike unprofitable EVs or idle steel mills, food production offers steady returns, supporting the middle class’s demand for diverse diets.
Why Democracy Would Have Mattered
A democratic China would have empowered individuals to challenge Xi’s fixation on manufacturing, real estate, and tech control, while avoiding policies that destabilized its population and food security:
- Contrast with "The Great Shift": The story shows China’s middle-class rise through manufacturing (Shenzhen’s factories) but ignores farmland loss, idle mills, and tech job losses. A democratic system could have balanced this, supporting families like Wei Chen’s while securing food supply, unlike the USA’s middle-class decline (the Thompsons’ story).
- Avoiding Current Vulnerabilities: Overcapacity’s backlash (tariffs from USA, EU, Japan, South Korea, India), $3.5 trillion in local debt (IMF, 2023), and tech crackdowns threaten jobs and export revenues for food imports. A democratic focus on agriculture could have mitigated this, employing millions in food production rather than steel mills or tech firms now faltering.
- Learning from Others: Democratic nations like Israel prioritized food security despite water constraints, while South Korea balanced manufacturing with agriculture. Xi’s regime ignored such models, misjudging global tolerance for its steel and tech dominance.
- Avoiding the One-Child Policy: Democracy would likely have prevented the authoritarian one-child policy (1980-2015), which shrank China’s population and skewed its demographics. The policy reduced rural populations, where higher birth rates are common, accelerating urban migration and farmland conversion. In a democracy, public opposition, as seen in democratic Japan and South Korea, would have favored family choice, likely leading to a larger rural population. While China’s population might still have stalled (like Japan’s or South Korea’s, with fertility rates of 1.3 and 0.8, respectively), rural families, less constrained by urban costs, would likely have had more children, stabilizing the population. A larger rural workforce could have sustained agricultural communities, preserving farmland and boosting food production, reducing reliance on imports and enhancing security.
Challenges and Counterarguments
While democracy could have prioritized food security and avoided the one-child policy, challenges remain:
- Scale: China’s 1.4 billion people require massive investment ($500 billion+), though its water advantage eases this.
- Urban Demand: The middle-class boom drove urbanization, making farmland conversion for steel mills, ghost cities, and cities hard to resist, even in a democracy.
- Globalism’s Pull: Cheap food imports might tempt a democratic China, though public pressure could counter this.
- Democratic Inefficiencies: Democracies can be slow, but Xi’s authoritarian waste (trillions on idle mills, EVs, and tech losses) suggests centralized errors are costlier.
- Population Dynamics: A larger rural population might strain resources, but higher agricultural output could offset this, as seen in democratic India’s rural growth.
Conclusion: The Cost of One Man’s Vision
When China’s GDP soared, the world envied Xi Jinping’s ability to “just get things done.” Now, as tax revenues falter, the $10 trillion real estate bubble bursts, and trillions in EVs, rail, steel mills, and tech crackdowns prove wasteful, the folly of entrusting a nation to one man is clear. The one-child policy, a hallmark of authoritarian control, decimated rural populations, undermining food security. If China were a democratic country, individual voices, market signals, and accountable governance could have prioritized food production over speculative industries, while avoiding demographic missteps. With more water per capita than Israel, China could have leveraged $1-2 trillion to implement drip irrigation, desalination, and land reclamation, reducing its $153 billion food import bill and employing millions in rural jobs. A larger rural population, sustained by democratic family policies, would have further bolstered agriculture. Instead, Xi’s regime built steel mills and ghost cities on farmland, now idle due to tariffs from the USA, EU, Japan, South Korea, and India, and crushed tech innovation, miscalculating global and domestic resilience. The story of "The Great Shift" celebrates China’s middle-class triumph, but a democratic China might have written a different chapter—one where food security and demographic balance, not overcapacity, defined its future.
Sources
- FAO (2020): Arable land loss, food import dependency.
- World Bank (2020): Middle-class growth, water per capita (1,800L Israel, 2,000L China).
- USDA (2023): Soybean imports, grain estimates.
- UNCTAD (2022): $153 billion food imports.
- Caixin (2023): EV market losses.
- Bloomberg (2018, 2023, 2024): Ghost cities, real estate bubble.
- OECD (2023): Steel overcapacity, capacity utilization.
- IMF (2023): China’s debt estimates.
- Reuters (2023): High-speed rail debt.
- Israeli Ministry of Agriculture (2020): Drip irrigation yields.
- Global Energy Monitor (2024): China’s steel capacity.
- American Iron and Steel Institute (2024): US steel jobs.
- Nikkei Asia (2024): Tech crackdown job losses.
- China Ministry of Finance (2023): Tax revenue decline.
- National Bureau of Statistics (2024): GDP growth, unemployment.
- X posts (2025): Steel mill closures, overcapacity.
- United Nations (2023): Japan (1.3), South Korea (0.8) fertility rates.
